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Abstract 
 
The literature on educational mismatches finds that overeducated 
workers suffer a wage penalty compared with properly educated 
workers with the same level of education. Recent literature also 
suggests that individuals’ skill heterogeneity could explain wage 
differences between overeducated and properly matched workers. The 
hypothesis is that overeducated workers earn less due to their lower 
competences and skills in relative terms. However, that hypothesis has 
been rarely tested due to data limitations on individuals’ skills. The aim 
of this paper is to test the individuals’ skill heterogeneity theory in 
Spain using microdata from PIAAC, because it is one of the developed 
countries supporting the highest overeducation rates and where its 
adult population holds the lowest level of skills among a set of 
developed countries. Our hypothesis is that the wage penalty of 
overeducation in Spain is explained by the lower skill level of 
overeducated workers. The obtained evidence confirms this hypothesis 
but only to a certain extent as skills only explain partially the wage 
penalty of overeducation. 
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1. Introduction  
 
There is a remarkable consensus on the effects of educational mismatch on wages using the standard 
ORU specification (Duncan and Hoffman, 1981). On the one hand, undereducated workers benefit 
from a wage premium compared to well-educated workers with the same level of education. On the 
other hand, overeducated workers earn more than their properly educated co-workers, but earn less 
than they would at a job requiring their level of education. So, while undereducated workers earn more 
than their properly matched counterparts, overeducated workers experience a wage penalty. 
 
One of the proposed theories to explain overeducation’s wage penalty is based on the assignment 
theory (Sattinger, 1993). It considers that workers’ productivity is limited by their job characteristics. So, 
overeducated workers may thus underutilize their skills, and, in consequence, they are less productive 
and obtain lower wages than well-educated workers with the same level of education. Following that 
idea, overeducation may imply overskilling. However, empirical evidence shows a weak correlation 
between both variables, which means that the assignment theory does not seem to be supported by 
data (Allen and van der Velden, 2001; Green and McIntosh, 2007).  
 
A supported alternative theory is based on the existence of individuals’ skill heterogeneity. From such a 
perspective, the wage penalty associated to overeducation is due to the huge variation of skills between 
workers with the same level of education. Then, overeducated workers would not suffer a wage penalty. 
In fact, they would earn lower wages as a result of their lower skills. If this hypothesis holds, the wage 
penalty will disappear once individuals’ skill level is included in the analysis. However, most of the 
literature does not explicitly test this hypothesis due to data limitations regarding individuals’ skill levels.  
 
In this paper we take advantage of the recently available database of the OECD Programme for the 
International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) because it includes information about 
individual skills from proficiency test’s scores. It allows testing whether individuals’ skill heterogeneity 
could explain the effects of educational mismatch on wages.  
We focus on the Spanish case because it has some interesting features that justify the analysis. It is a 
developed country supporting one of the largest percentages of overeducated workers (OECD, 2013a), 
a feature that was also observed before the current economic crisis (OECD, 2009; and Verhaest and 
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van der Velden, 2013). At the same time, the Spanish population1 has one of the lowest levels of 
proficiency in literacy and numeracy skills (OECD, 2013a).  
 
Therefore, the specific aims of the paper are twofold: 
 
1) Test whether the assignment theory is supported or not by the Spanish data. With this aim we will 
perform a statistical analysis of the correlation between both educational and skill mismatches.   
 
2) Test the individuals’ skill heterogeneity theory in Spain. Our hypothesis is that the wage penalty 
associated to overeducation could be explained by their lower skill levels. In consequence, overeducated 
workers may not be suffering a wage penalty in Spain, but their earnings are determined by their skill 
level.  
Our results show a weak correlation between educational and skill mismatches, as it is found in other 
analyses. Thus, the assignment theory does not seem to be supported by Spanish data. We also find that 
individuals’ skill heterogeneity only explains 18% of the effect of educational mismatch on wages in 
Spain. The wage penalty still remains for those overeducated workers who are not less skilled than 
properly matched workers.    
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, section 2 provides a literature review on the analysis 
of skills in educational mismatch. Section 3 introduces the PIAAC data and explains how educational 
and skills mismatch are measured. Section 4 shows the relationship between overeducation and 
overskilling. Section 5 quantifies the wage penalty of overeducation and the impact of skills using 
different specifications. Section 6 concludes with some final remarks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Along with Italy (OECD, 2013a) 
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2. Literature review 
 
Different theories have been considered in order to explain the overeducation phenomenon (see 
Leuven and Oosberbeek, 2011 and Quintini, 2011 for a review). However, the most frequently 
regarded are the assignment model and individuals’ skills heterogeneity. 
 
The assignment theory (Sattinger, 1993) makes the assumption that human capital returns depend on 
both the workers’ human capital and the match between the worker and the job. From such a 
perspective, workers’ productivity is limited by their job characteristics. So, overeducated workers may 
underutilize their skills and, in consequence, they are less productive and obtain lower wages than well-
educated workers with the same level of education. Following that idea, overeducation may imply 
overskilling – or broadly speaking, educational mismatch may imply skill mismatch. 
Thanks to the availability of recent databases providing questions relative to skill mismatch, the 
assignment theory has been explicitly tested. Skill mismatch has been measured by means of subjective 
workers’ responses about whether they consider that their skills are used enough in their jobs. 
Following the specification developed by Verdugo and Verdugo (1989), different studies have included 
dummy variables for both educational and skill mismatch in the empirical analysis (Allen and van der 
Velden, 2001; Di Pietro and Urwin, 2006; Green and McIntosh, 2007; Sánchez-Sánchez and 
McGuiness, 2013; Mavromaras et al. 2013). It has been found that overeducation and overskilling have 
both a negative and statistically significant effect on earnings within the same level of education, the 
overeducation effect being much higher than the overskilling effect. This result underlines that wage 
penalization associated with overeducation is not explained by under-utilization or waste of workers’ 
skills, whereas the assignment theory is not supported by the results. They may suggest the existence of 
heterogeneity of workers’ skills. However, they do not explicitly test this theory due to a lack of 
information about workers’ skill level rather than skill mismatches. 
 
Specifically, the heterogeneous skills theory takes into account human capital differences between 
workers. It considers that workers’ productivity depends on the human capital level acquired, regardless 
of job characteristics. Therefore, the observed wage differences among overeducated and 
undereducated workers compared to well-matched workers with the same educational level may only 
reflect individual differences in human capital within educational levels. In other words, overeducated 
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workers may be less productive because they have less human capital, not because their job imposes 
limitations on their productivity.  
 
As has been mentioned before, data availability on workers’ skill levels is very limited, whereas different 
approaches have been considered in empirical analysis to attempt to control for individual skill 
heterogeneity in the wage equation estimation.  
 
One approach involves the consideration of panel data sets in order to control for all unobserved 
individual fixed effects (Bauer, 2002; Frenette, 2004; Korpi and Tåhlin, 2009; Tsai, 2010). They find 
that the wage penalty associated with being overeducated falls dramatically and even disappears when it 
is estimated by fixed effects, suggesting that (part of) the effect of educational mismatch is caused by 
unobserved individual ability. 
 
Instead of using a longitudinal framework, Chevalier (2003) analyses cross-sectional data. He creates a 
proxy of workers’ unobserved productivity taking the difference between the estimated and the 
observed earnings in their first job. In this case, after accounting for the unobserved heterogeneity, the 
wage penalty for overeducation is slightly reduced. Using a similar methodology, Chevalier and Lindley 
(2009) arrive at analogous results. They construct a measure of unobserved ability as the residual from a 
first-job earnings equation, capturing all individual’s observed characteristics including job 
characteristics that affect wages. These residuals should then be a proxy for all time-invariant 
unobservable characteristics. Chevalier (2003) also introduces a new approach overlapping 
overeducation and workers’ job satisfaction. He divides overeducation into two categories: ‘apparent’ 
overeducation, composed of satisfied graduate workers; and ‘genuine’ overeducation, consisting of 
dissatisfied graduate workers. Results show that ‘genuine’ overeducation brings a much larger pay 
penalty than ‘apparent’ overeducation.  
 
Following this approach, Green and Zhu (2010) find similar results. They also consider different types 
of overeducation but use a direct measure of skills. Korpi and Tåhlin (2009) also include explicit 
indicators of ability in an analysis of Sweden using panel data, and the effect of overeducation on wages 
still remains statistically significant.  
 
The recent study of Levels et al. (2013) also includes individuals’ skill level in the analysis using PIAAC 
data. They analyse the effect of workers’ skills level on the effect of educational mismatches derived 
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from ORU specification for different OECD countries. They find that a considerable part of the effect 
of educational mismatches on wages can be attributed to skill heterogeneity, but it still remains 
statistically significant. 
 
In summary, empirical evidence does not seem to support the assignment theory, given that there is a 
weak relation between educational and skill mismatches. The individuals’ skill heterogeneity theory 
seem to be the most supported explanation for the observed wage differences between overeducated 
and properly matched workers.  
 
Although there is a wide literature analysing the impact of overeducation on wages in Spain (see Alba-
Ramírez, 1993; Murillo et al. 2012; Nieto and Ramos, 2013; among others), to our knowledge, no 
extensive analysis has tested the role of individuals’ skill level on educational mismatch focusing on the 
Spanish case.  
 
 
3. Data sources and variable definition 
 
3.1. PIAAC database 
 
The Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) is a survey which 
has been conducted by the OECD. It assesses the proficiency of adults from age 16 onwards in literacy, 
numeracy and problem solving in technology-rich environments. In addition, the survey collects a 
range of information on reading, writing and numeracy-related activities of respondents, as well as 
education, labour and family background variables. It was conducted in 24 countries (22 OECD 
countries) between 2011 and 2012.   
 
Participation in the problem-solving domain was optional, and Spain (and other countries) did not 
participate in it. As a consequence, the competences we analyse are related to literacy and numeracy. 
Specifically, the two domains are defined in the following way: 
 
- Literacy: ability to understand, evaluate, use and engage with written texts to participate in 
society, to achieve one’s goals, and to develop one’s knowledge and potential. Literacy 
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encompasses a range of skills from the decoding of written words and sentences to the 
comprehension, interpretation, and evaluation of complex texts.  
- Numeracy: ability to access, use, interpret and communicate mathematical information and 
ideas in order to engage in and manage the mathematical demands of a range of situations in 
adult life. To this end, numeracy involves managing a situation or solving a problem in a real 
context, by responding to mathematical content/ information/ideas represented in multiple 
ways. 
 
Both literacy and numeracy are measured by 10 plausible values calculated using Item Response Theory 
(IRT), which are represented on a 500-point scale.  The idea is that each individual only responds to a 
limited number of items in the test. To avoid the assignation of missing values in those items which 
have not been included in the test, the procedure predicts scores using answers from the test and 
background questionnaires of similar individuals. It generates a distribution of values for each 
individual and their associated probabilities, with ten plausible values randomly obtained for each 
individual. This method prevents bias from estimating the result from a small number of test questions. 
We also consider the jackknife method (80 replicate weights) implemented in PIAAC to derive standard 
errors in wage regressions2.  
 
Given the high correlation between literacy and numeracy skill level (0.92), we only perform the next 
analysis using literacy skills. However, we repeat the whole analysis using numeracy skills instead of 
literacy skills as a robustness check.  
 
We consider two sets of variables. The first one includes variables related to workers’ human capital as 
years of education (derived from levels of education), experience, experience squared, non-formal 
education, and 10 plausible values test scores in literacy. The second one is composed of other 
personal, job related and regional variables that are included in the model as controls3. These variables 
are gender, age, nationality, type of contract (full-time/part-time), contact term (temporary/permanent), 
sector (public/private), economic activity (industry, agriculture, construction, services, non-sale 
services) and 17 regions. 
 
2 See OECD (2013b): Technical Report of the Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) for more details about IRT and the Jackknife 
method. 
3 The estimation results for these explanatory variables will not be discussed. A full set of the estimation results is available 
on request. 
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The initial Spanish sample was composed of 6055 observations. We restrict the sample to employed 
workers who were not enrolled in education at the time. We drop from the analysis armed forces 
workers, and participants who did not give some of the information we need to perform the analysis. 
The final sample was 1928 observations. Table 1 of the Annex shows the descriptive analysis of the 
variables previously defined.  
 
 
3.2 Measuring educational and skill mismatches 
 
There are different methods to measure educational mismatch: the objective, the subjective or workers’ 
self-assessment and the statistical or realized matches. All of them have advantages and drawbacks, 
whereas using either measure method finally depends on the availability of the data (see Hartog, 2000; 
and Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2011; for a review). 
 
The PIAAC data allows us to measure required schooling using both the worker’s self-assessment and 
the statistical method.  
 
The self-assessment method relies on questions that ask workers about the schooling requirements of 
their job. The PIAAC questionnaire specifically contains the following questions: “If applying today, what 
would be the usual qualifications, if any, that someone would need to get this type of job?”. Educational mismatch is 
obtained by comparing workers’ answers about required education and attained education. Workers are 
properly or well-matched when their attained education matches with their jobs’ required education. 
Conversely, overeducated (undereducated) workers have more (less) attained education than required 
by their jobs.    
 
The statistical method (both mean and mode versions) uses information about workers’ schooling and 
their occupations. Regarding the mean version, the required amount of schooling for a worker is 
determined by the mean of attained education of all workers holding the same occupation. Workers are 
then defined to be overeducated or undereducated if their attained education deviates at least one 
standard deviation from the mean in their occupation. The mode version measure required schooling 
from the mode of attained education of all workers holding the same occupation. It classifies 
overeducated or undereducated workers according to whether their education differs from the mode in 
their occupation.  
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Table 1 shows the impact of educational mismatch in Spain using the self-assessment method. About 
half of workers in Spain have a proper match between their education and occupation. From the 
remaining workers, the PIAAC data highlights that overeducation is affecting 35.63%, 3.8 being the 
average number of surplus years of education. On the other hand, undereducation concerns the other 
15% and their average number of deficit years of education is 3.1. 4 5 
Table 1: Educational mismatch  
 Percentage Average mismatch in years of education  
Undereducation 15.17 3.10 (deficit)
Proper education 49.20 0.00
Overeducation 35.63 3.80 (surplus)
Source: Own elaboration using PIAAC data. Individual sample weights have been considered.   
 
The percentages obtained by the statistical method are shown in Table A.2 of Annex. It is worth noting 
that different measurement methods were used to report different percentages of educational 
mismatch, although they are considered to be the same country and the same database. However, the 
impact on wages is consistent regardless of the measurement method considered (Hartog, 2000). We 
perform the main analysis measuring educational mismatch using the self-assessment method, and we 
repeat it using the statistical method as a robustness check.  
 
With regards to the measurement of skill mismatch, we follow the approach defined by the OECD 
using PIAAC data (Pellizzari and Fichen, 2013; OECD, 2013a). It is a combination of workers’ self-
assessment questions and their skill proficiency score. The survey asks workers whether they feel they 
“have the skills to cope with more demanding duties than those they are required to perform in their current job” and 
whether they feel they “need further training in order to cope well with their present duties”. To compute the 
OECD measure of skills mismatch, workers are classified as well-skilled in a domain if their skill 
proficiency score in that domain is between the minimum and maximum score observed among 
workers who answered “no” to both questions in the same 1-digit occupation (and country). Workers 
are over-skilled in a domain if their score is higher than the maximum score of self-reported well-skilled 
4 Although OECD (2013a) measures educational mismatch using the same self-assessment method than us, the percentages 
of mismatch are different. The reason of those differences is that they cluster education into 4 levels while we take 
advantage of the maximum level of disaggregation of the data.  
5 Similar incidence of educational mismatch in Spain has been found by Murillo et.al. (2012)  
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workers, and they are under-skilled in a domain if their score is lower than the minimum score of self-
reported well-skilled workers.  
 
Individual weighted results show that 72% of workers have a good match between their skills and those 
required by their jobs. Moreover, overskilling affects 21.4% of workers whereas 6.5% are underskilled.
4. Are overeducated workers also overskilled?  
 
As it has been explained in the previous sections, individuals’ skill heterogeneity is one of the 
explanations of the fact that assignment theory does not seem to be supported by empirical evidence. 
In other words, most studies have usually found a weak correlation between overeducation and 
overskilling.  
 
In this section, we analyse the correlation between both educational and skill mismatch (Table 2) to 
check whether the assignment theory is supported or not using data for Spain. We also compare the 
distribution of skills between different types of workers to find differences that could suggest the 
existence of individuals’ skill heterogeneity. 
  
The PIAAC data for Spain shows that all workers have a higher probability of being well-skilled, 
regardless of their education-occupation (mis)match. In particular, we find that 72% of undereducated 
and 70% of overeducated workers are well-skilled in their jobs. It is surprising that only 7.5% of 
undereducated workers are also underskilled and 20% have an excess of skills. However, the data 
shows that 23% of overeducated workers are also overskilled. This results is consistent with Allen and 
van der Velden (2001) and Green and McIntosh (2007). Indeed, the Pearson chi-square test formally 
validates the lack of correlation between educational and skill mismatch in Spain6. 
 
 
 
 
6  The Pearson chi-square test rejects the null hypothesis of non-correlation between variables. Pearson chi2(4) =  4.1182   
Pr = 0.390. 
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Table 2: Distribution of undereducated, well-matched and overeducated workers by their skill 
(mis)match in literacy (in %) 
  Underskilling Proper skills Overskilling Total 
Undereducation 7.48 72.24 20.28 100.00 
Proper education 6.52 73.18 20.29 100.00 
Overeducation 6.02 70.62 23.36 100.00 
Source: Own elaboration using PIAAC data. Individual sample weights have been considered.    
 
Thus, the empirical evidence for Spain does not seem to support the assignment theory, since 
educational mismatches are not associated to skill mismatches.  
 
Figure 1 shows the skill level of workers by educational mismatches and by different levels of education 
in order to provide preliminary evidence existence of skill heterogeneity between workers.  It shows 
that overeducated workers hold a lower skill level than properly educated workers with the same 
educational level. That fact is repeated for all educational levels (except for bachelor degree). However, 
undereducated workers tend to have a higher skill level than properly-educated workers with the same 
educational level (except for upper secondary education).  
 
Figure 1: Average skills levels of workers by educational level. 
 
Source: Own elaboration using PIAAC data. Individual sample weights considered. 
 
Thus, the data show skill heterogeneity between workers with the same level of education. This fact 
could explain the wage differences between workers according to their education-occupation match. 
This is empirically tested in the following sections 4 and 5. 
Research Institute of Applied Economics Working Paper 2014/11, pàg. 14 
Regional Quantitative Analysis Research Group Working Paper 2014/06, pag. 14 
14 
5.  Educational mismatch, skills and wages 
 
5.1. Empirical models  
 
In order to quantify the effect of educational mismatch on wages, different specifications based on the 
traditional wage equation (Mincer, 1974) have been proposed in the literature: the ORU specification 
developed by Duncan and Hoffman (1981) and the Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) specification. The 
traditional wage model considers formal education as a proxy of individuals’ human capital. However, it 
is well known that there are components of human capital such as skills or ability. We therefore also 
include individuals’ skills in all three models.  
 
Specifically, the traditional wage equation is defined as follows: 
 
    (1a) 
 
where  is the logarithm of the hourly wage of worker i;  refers to the number of years of 
formal education;  is a vector of control variables related to personal, job and regional characteristics 
that also includes other human capital variables such as experience, experience squared and a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the worker has participated in some non-formal education activity 
during the last 12 months prior to the survey and 0 otherwise. Finally, is the error term with zero 
mean and constant variance.   
 
Including the individuals’ proficiency skills , the modified model is then defined as: 
 
    (1b) 
 
where  is a continuous variable measured by scores in a 500-point scale. The higher the score is, 
the higher the individual’s skill level.   
 
A variant of the traditional Mincerian wage equation is the ORU (Over-Required-Under-educated) 
specification created by Duncan and Hoffman (1981). This specification splits years of education  
into three variables: years of education required for the job ( ), years of overeducation ( ) and years 
of undereducation ( ).  
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Specifically, it holds that   
 
In this sense, the following is determined:  
-  if the worker is overeducated and 0 if otherwise, and  
-  if the worker is undereducated and 0 if otherwise.  
 
The ORU equation is then defined as: 
 
     (2a) 
 
The other variables’ definitions are the same as in specification (1a). The interpretation of the 
coefficients associated with over- and undereducation is compared with well-matched workers in the 
same job. The usual findings in the literature are . 
 
In order to test the individual’s skill heterogeneity hypothesis, we also include the variable related to 
individuals’ skills: 
 
   (2b) 
 
The variable  is defined as in equation (1b). If individuals’ skills heterogeneity completely explains 
the wages’ effects of educational mismatch, we should get . If this is true, workers’ 
remuneration composed by their education and skills would be determined by the required education 
and their individual skill level.   
 
Another contribution to the overeducation literature has been defined by Verdugo and Verdugo (1989, 
henceforth V&V). This model includes dummy variables related to overeducation and undereducation 
using the Mincerian wage equation.  
 
The V&V equation is defined as: 
 
    (3a) 
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where OE is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the worker is overeducated and 0 otherwise, 
and UE is also a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the worker is undereducated and 0 
otherwise. The coefficients associated with both variables show the average wage effect of being 
overeducated and undereducated compared with well-matched workers with the same level of 
education. The usual finding is that overeducated workers have a wage penalization and undereducated 
workers benefit from a wage premium compared to well-matched workers with the same educational 
level. That is,  and . 
 
We also extend that model including skill level variable. The extended V&V model is then defined as 
follows:  
 
   (3b) 
 
In the case that the individual’s skills heterogeneity theory is valid, we expect that both coefficients 
associated with overeducation and undereducation are not statistically significant once we control for 
individuals’ skills. If this is so, workers would be remunerated by their attained education and skills 
level.    
 
 
5. 2. Results 
 
In line with similar studies (see, for instance, Dolton and Vignoles, 2000; and Di Prieto and Urwin, 
2006), we control in all the previous specifications for a possible problem of sample selection bias 
estimating using Heckman two step specification (Heckman, 1979). This procedure takes into account 
the possibility that employed workers may not be a random subsample of the sample we are 
considering. The first step estimates the probability of being employed using a probit equation7 (see the 
results in Table A.3). Then, the probit estimation is used to construct a selection bias control factor, 
which is included as an explanatory variable in the wage equation8.  
 
7 The probit equation of the probability of being employed includes as explanatory variables gender, experience, experience 
squared, years of attained education, immigrant status, number of children, whether individual is living with spouse or not, 
and regional dummies.  
8 The variables we use as exclusion restrictions are both number of children at home and whether individual is living with 
partner or not. Those variables affect the probability of being employed, but do not determine wages.  
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As we focus on the analysis of the variables related to human capital, we only comment on the results 
of those variables in the main test. However, it is worth noting that the coefficients associated to 
control variables are similar to those in the previous literature. Furthermore, it is found that the lambda 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant for all specifications. Hence, the omission of the 
information about the probability of being employed in the wage analysis would imply a bias in the 
results. 
 
Table 3 reports the results from the estimations of the Mincerian wage models specified in equations 
(1a) and (1b), the ORU models defined in equations (2a) and (2b) and the V&V specifications defined 
in equations (3a) and (3b).  
 
With respect to the traditional Mincer’s models, it is shown that the returns of the variables related to 
human capital are similar to previous literature findings (column 1). The return of attained education is 
6.4% per year. The years of experience in work also has a positive impact on wages, but there is a 
moment that its positive impact is decreasing. Finally, training activities in non-formal education also 
has a positive and significant effect on wages (13%).   
 
When individuals’ skills are included in the model (column 2), we find a positive statistically significant 
effect on wages. Specifically, for each skill’s score, individuals have a return of 0.14%. The magnitude 
of the effect of skills may seem small, but it is important to remember that skills are measured by scores 
in a 500-point scale. Furthermore, the coefficients of the other variables related to human capital 
(education, experience and non-formal education) are reduced once skills are included. 
 
Regarding the ORU specification defined in equation (2a), we find that the return of required education 
is higher than the return of attained education. It points out the existence of educational mismatch. 
Contrary of most of literature, we find that the return of one year of overeducation is lower than the 
return (in absolute term) of one year of undereducation. In particular, overeducated workers obtain for 
each surplus year of education a 3% higher salary than well-educated workers in the same job. 
Undereducated workers obtain a 3.7% lower wage than well-educated workers in the same job.  
 
In order to test the individuals’ skill heterogeneity theory, individuals’ skills are included explicitly in the 
ORU model as specified in equation (2b). Skills have a positive and statistically significant effect on 
wages, but the effects of educational mismatch still remain statistically significant. Thus, for each year 
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of required education, wage increases 7.45%. The coefficient related with years of overeducation falls 
from 3% to 2.4% and the coefficient for years of undereducation decreases from 3.7% to 3.1%. Indeed, 
the hypothesis that years of overeducation and years of undereducation are both equal to 0 (ie. 2 = 3 
= 0) after controlling for skill is rejected at a level of 1% significance. Hence, the obtained results show 
that individual’s skills heterogeneity explains only part of the wage effects of educational mismatch, and 
therefore our initial hypothesis about the Spanish case is not supported by the data. Specifically, skills 
only explain 18% of the wage’s effect of overeducation and 14% of the effect of undereducation on 
wages. The obtained results are in line with the analysis of Levels et al. (2013) for a set of OECD 
countries. 
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Table 3. Estimated earnings functions  
 Mincer ORU V&V 
VARIABLES (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
   
Male 0.208*** 0.189*** 0.193*** 0.179*** 0.195*** 0.180***
 [0.0224] [0.0186] [0.0218] [0.0185] [0.0219] [0.0178]
Immigrant -0.108*** -0.0728** -0.0728** -0.0471 -0.0840** -0.0550
 [0.0357] [0.0355] [0.0350] [0.0339] [0.0355] [0.0347]
Attained education (years) 0.0617*** 0.0529*** 0.0706*** 0.0627***
 [0.00509] [0.00482] [0.00504] [0.00494]
Required education 
(years) 
 0.0715*** 0.0642***  
  [0.00530] [0.00517]  
Overeducation (years)  0.0295*** 0.0243***  
  [0.00657] [0.00597]  
Undereducation (years)  -0.0361*** -0.0310***  
  [0.00919] [0.00831]  
Overeducation (dummy)  -0.158*** -0.151***
  [0.0211] [0.0207]
Undereducation (dummy)  0.123*** 0.117***
  [0.0309] [0.0253]
Skill level (scores)  0.00144*** 0.00111***  0.00122***
  [0.000291] [0.000293]  [0.000292]
Experience 0.0170*** 0.0165*** 0.0172*** 0.0168*** 0.0170*** 0.0166***
 [0.00393] [0.00389] [0.00389] [0.00383] [0.00381] [0.00385]
Experience2 -0.000206** -0.000173** -0.000246*** -0.000218*** -0.000236*** -0.000207**
 [8.40e-05] [8.45e-05] [8.20e-05] [8.12e-05] [8.15e-05] [8.19e-05]
Non-formal education 0.128*** 0.120*** 0.0974*** 0.0934*** 0.103*** 0.0984***
 [0.0220] [0.0204] [0.0213] [0.0198] [0.0214] [0.0202]
Full-time -0.0379 -0.0307 -0.0512 -0.0449 -0.0520 -0.0452
 [0.0352] [0.0350] [0.0350] [0.0359] [0.0348] [0.0358]
Permanent 0.106*** 0.0995*** 0.0907*** 0.0869*** 0.0896*** 0.0852***
 [0.0265] [0.0280] [0.0261] [0.0276] [0.0260] [0.0272]
Public sector 0.135*** 0.137*** 0.151*** 0.151*** 0.150*** 0.150***
 [0.0355] [0.0376] [0.0337] [0.0355] [0.0338] [0.0349]
Activity sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lambda mills 0.115** 0.116*** 0.0871* 0.0896** 0.0968** 0.0986***
 [0.0512] [0.0396] [0.0526] [0.0406] [0.0487] [0.0377]
Constant 0.677*** 0.442*** 0.692*** 0.511*** 0.681*** 0.483***
 [0.149] [0.123] [0.150] [0.125] [0.143] [0.120]
   
Observations 1928 1928 1928 1928 1928 1928
R-squared 0.392 0.404 0.432 0.438 0.425 0.432
   
Ho: 2 = 3 = 0  23.35***  
Standard errors in parentheses. *Statistically significant at the 10% level. **Statistically significant at the 5% level. ***Statistically significant at the 
1% level. Individual sample weights considered. Equations (1b), (2b) and (3b) also take into account the 10 plausible values of skill level and the 80 
replications weights in both estimations.  
 
Finally, the results from V&V specifications defined in equations (3a) and (3b) are shown in the last 
columns of table 4. The effects of both dummy variables related to overeducation and undereducation 
are in line with previous literature. Overeducated workers suffer a wage penalization compared to well-
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educated workers with the same level of education while undereducated workers earn higher wages 
than well-educated workers with the same level of education. Once individual’s skills are included in the 
model (equation 3b), the effects of educational mismatches are very slightly reduced. Specifically, the 
penalty associated with overeducated workers is reduced from 17.1% to 16.3%. On the other hand, the 
premium of undereducated workers falls from 13.1% to 12.4%. As  found in the results from the ORU 
specifications, these results do not seem to support the heterogeneity skills theory, since the effects of 
overeducation and undereducation still remain once skill is controlled for.  
 
To sum up, we find that individuals’ skills are important to determine individuals’ wages as well as other 
human capital variables. However, contrary to our initial hypothesis, we do not find that individuals’ 
skills heterogeneity completely explains the effect of educational mismatch on wages. Specifically, the 
lower skills of overeducated workers only explain 18% of their lower wages compared to well-matched 
workers with the same level of education. 
 
 
5.3. Robustness checks 
 
The PIAAC data allows us to perform some robustness checks to validate the previous results.  
 
First, literature shows that the incidence of both overeducation and undereducation could be different 
depending on the measurement method applied. However, the effects on wages are quite consistent 
regardless of the measurement method. Besides the self-assessment method, the PIAAC data allows us 
to measure educational mismatch by means of both versions of the statistical method, the mean and the 
mode. The results from the ORU specification measuring educational mismatch by means of both 
statistical methods confirm the main results (Table A.4. of Annex). Specifically, individuals’ skills only 
explain 14% of the wage penalty of overeducated workers in both models.   
 
Second, we use the variable skill level in numeracy instead of skill level of literacy. As we have already 
notice, both variables are highly correlated, and therefore we decided not to include both together. We 
also estimate the ORU specifications including numeracy skills instead of literacy skills (Table A.5. of 
Annex). The results show that the wage penalty of overeducated workers is reduced but still remains 
once skills are included. Specifically, individual’s skills heterogeneity explains 22% of the wage penalty.    
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6. Final remarks 
The main objective of this paper is to analyse whether individual’s skill heterogeneity explains the wage 
penalty of being overeducated in Spain. Our hypothesis is that the wage penalty associated with 
overeducation could be explained by the low skill level of overeducated workers, since Spain holds the 
lowest level of skill among its population. As a consequence, overeducated workers may not be 
suffering a wage penalty in Spain, and otherwise their earnings are determined by their skill level. Our 
results show that individuals’ skill heterogeneity only explains 18% of the effect of educational 
mismatch on wages in Spain. The wage penalty of overeducated workers still remains for those who are 
not less skilled than properly educated workers.    
 
There are some policy recommendations associated with the previous results. On the one hand, as part 
of the effect of overeducation on wages is due to a lack of competence or skills of overeducated 
workers, educational policy makers should focus on defining the level of competence or skills that 
should be acquired at each level of education. Indeed, skills should be evaluated at educational 
institutions in the same way as education.   
 
On the other hand, other measures should be taken into account by policy makers in Spain, since the 
wage penalty still remains after controlling for individual skills. First, educational institutions should 
give all the information about the employability of each type of education to students before they start 
a specialized course. Second, they should also encourage students in entrepreneurship. Self-
employment could be a way to overcome the lack of demand for specific workers. Finally, the Spanish 
government should make an effort to promote the creation of companies that require high-skilled 
workers to create a production system based on high technologies.  
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Annex: 
 
Table A.1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Log(wage) 2.18 0.50 0.18 4.53
Literacy proficiency 260.07 42.87 78.76 367.19
Numeracy proficiency 256.71 44.50 82.32 380.86
Age 41.32 10.08 16 65
Male 0.55 0.50 0 1
Immigrant 0.13 0.33 0 1
Attained education  12.21 3.43 6 21
Experience  18.45 10.66 0 55
Experience squared  453.88 470.44 0 3025
Non-formal education  0.56 0.50 0 1
Full time job 0.85 0.36 0 1
Permanent contract 0.81 0.39 0 1
Public sector 0.25 0.43 0 1
Agriculture  0.04 0.19 0 1
Construct 0.07 0.25 0 1
Services 0.47 0.50 0 1
No-sale services 0.28 0.45 0 1
Source: PIAAC. Individual sample weights considered. Number of observations 1928. 
Table A.2. Educational mismatch using the statistical method.  
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max
MODE     
Overeducation 0.3516185 0.4775994 0 1
Proper education 0.3975564 0.4895198 0 1
Undereducation 0.2508252 0.4336005 0 1
     
Years overeducation 3.3781 1.771671 1 11
Years undereducation 3.599314 1.629411 1 11
MEAN     
Overeducation 0.1409579 0.3480684 0 1
Proper education 0.6873661 0.4636868 0 1
Undereducation 0.171676 0.3771964 0 1
     
Years overeducation 1.30805 1.07916 0.0111046 4.856499
Years undereducation 1.429313 1.103022 0.1687933 6.62323
Source: Own elaboration using PIAAC data. Individual sample weights considered. 
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Table A.3. Heckman’s specification first step. Determinants of being employed. 
VARIABLES (1)
Male 0.202***
 [0.0458]
Experience 0.0702***
 [0.00676]
Experience2 -0.00109***
 [0.000155]
Attained education  0.106***
 [0.00649]
Immigrant -0.0564
 [0.0673]
Number of children -0.0674***
 [0.0247]
Living with spouse 0.0158
 [0.0557]
Regional dummies Yes
Constant -1.996***
 [0.145]
  
Observations 4689
Standard errors in parentheses. *Statistically significant at the 10% level. **Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level. Individual sample weights considered. 
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Table A.4. Estimated earnings ORU functions measuring educational mismatch by means of the 
statistical method (mode and mean).
 Mode Mean
VARIABLES (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) 
     
Male 0.202*** 0.187*** 0.209*** 0.193*** 
 [0.0216] [0.0181] [0.0212] [0.0181] 
Immigrant -0.0765** -0.0488 -0.0626* -0.0362 
 [0.0352] [0.0348] [0.0350] [0.0336] 
Required education (years) 0.0823*** 0.0741*** 0.0977*** 0.0884*** 
 [0.00550] [0.00547] [0.00602] [0.00630] 
Overeducation (years) 0.0431*** 0.0369*** 0.0720*** 0.0618*** 
 [0.00662] [0.00657] [0.0168] [0.0158] 
Undereducation (years) -0.0393*** -0.0330*** -0.0799*** -0.0690*** 
 [0.00767] [0.00714] [0.0141] [0.0142] 
Skill level (scores)  0.00118***  0.00123*** 
  [0.000284]  [0.000281] 
Experience 0.0161*** 0.0157*** 0.0148*** 0.0147*** 
 [0.00382] [0.00384] [0.00340] [0.00363] 
Experience2 -0.000214*** -0.000187** -0.000211*** -0.000186** 
 [8.17e-05] [8.40e-05] [7.77e-05] [8.16e-05] 
Non-formal education 0.102*** 0.0976*** 0.0978*** 0.0928*** 
 [0.0220] [0.0208] [0.0224] [0.0212] 
Full-time -0.0365 -0.0307 -0.0397 -0.0334 
 [0.0340] [0.0350] [0.0342] [0.0360] 
Permanent 0.101*** 0.0964*** 0.105*** 0.0985*** 
 [0.0255] [0.0273] [0.0252] [0.0255] 
Public sector 0.130*** 0.131*** 0.142*** 0.141*** 
 [0.0348] [0.0362] [0.0350] [0.0365] 
Activity sector Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regions Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lambda  0.0793 0.0819** 0.0496 0.0610** 
 [0.0511] [0.0400] [0.0306] [0.0264] 
Constant 0.492*** 0.309** 0.379*** 0.183* 
 [0.147] [0.120] [0.123] [0.111] 
     
Observations 1928 1928 1928 1928 
R-squared 0.429 0.437 0.429 0.438 
Standard errors in parentheses. *Statistically significant at the 10% level. **Statistically significant at the 5% level. ***Statistically significant at the 
1% level. Individual sample weights considered. Column s (1b) and (2b) also take into account the 10 plausible values of skill level and the 80 
replications weights in both estimations.  
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Table A.5. Estimated earnings ORU functions using numeracy skills 
VARIABLES (1a) (1b)
   
Male 0.193*** 0.169***
 [0.0218] [0.0190]
Immigrant -0.0728** -0.0424
 [0.0350] [0.0336]
Required education (years) 0.0715*** 0.0624***
 [0.00530] [0.00539]
Overeducation (years) 0.0295*** 0.0231***
 [0.00657] [0.00603]
Undereducation (years) -0.0361*** -0.0310***
 [0.00919] [0.00830]
Skill level (scores)  0.00131***
  [0.000299]
Experience 0.0172*** 0.0163***
 [0.00389] [0.00386]
Experience2 -0.000246*** -0.000205**
 [8.20e-05] [8.19e-05]
Non-formal education 0.0974*** 0.0906***
 [0.0213] [0.0195]
Full-time -0.0512 -0.0420
 [0.0350] [0.0360]
Permanent 0.0907*** 0.0840***
 [0.0261] [0.0277]
Public sector 0.151*** 0.150***
 [0.0337] [0.0354]
Activity sector Yes Yes
Regions Yes Yes
Lambda 0.0871* 0.0908**
 [0.0526] [0.0412]
Constant 0.692*** 0.497***
 [0.150] [0.123]
   
Observations 1928 1928
R-squared 0.432 0.441
Standard errors in parentheses. *Statistically significant at the 10% level. **Statistically significant at the 5% level. ***Statistically significant at the 
1% level. Individual sample weights considered. Column (1b) also takes into account the 10 plausible values of skill level and the 80 replications 
weights in both estimations.  
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